State of Utah v. Ralph Leroy Menzies : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
State of Utah v. Ralph Leroy Menzies : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Brad Rich; Attorney for Appellant;
Robert Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Menzies, No. 16323 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1635
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
MLPH LEROY MENZIES, Case No. 16323 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
An appeal from the judgment and conviction of the crime 
of Escape in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding. 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
BRAD RICH 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
~ ~ F [l! ~~ L= ,,._, 
1g7s 
~ 
C J-r' r"";: ll'·,Jf--. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREl1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
~PH LEROY MENZIES, Case No. 16323 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
An appeal from the judgment and conviction of the crime 
of Escape in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding. 
ROBERT HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
BRAD RICH 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOI<JER COURT. 
, RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL 
BECAUSE THE VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
Page 
1 
1 
1 
2 
EVIDENCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
POINT II: APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL 
OF THE CONVICTION IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE 
AND DISMISSAL OF THAT CHARGE BECAUSE HE WAS 
DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. . . . . . 6 
POINT III: APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT PROSECUTION 
CONVICTION AND SENTENCING OF THE APPELLANT FOR 
THE CRIHE OF ESCAPE CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
AND/OR DOUBLE PUNISH!1ENT FOR SAID CRIHE 19 
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . 22 
CASES CITED 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 
93 (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, S.Ct. 455 (1972) 13,15,18 
Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 49 L.Ed. 950, 25 S.Ct. 573 
0905) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
3enton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 785 (1969). 19 
3ovle v. State, 569 P.2d 1026 (Okla., 1977) 21 
Collins v. State, 524 P.2d 715 (Kan., 1974) 21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dickey v. State 
90 S. Ct. 1564 
of Florida, 
(1970) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
398 U.S. 30, 26 
Ex Parte Kirk, 252 p. 2d 1032 (Okla. , 1953). 
Hamby v. State, 559 P.2d 1388 (Wyo., 1977). 
Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 20 
88 S. Ct. zoos (1968) 
Page 
L.Ed.2d 26, 
12 
20 ' 
21 
L.Ed.2d 1047, 
ll 
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 2 L.Ed.2d 913, 78 S.Ct. 
29 (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 18 L.Ed.2d 1, 87 
S.Ct. 988 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . 6,10 
Marion v. United States, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 92 
S. Ct. 455 (1971) . . . . . . . . 13 
Martz v. State, 566 P.2d 222 (T:Jyo., 1977) 21 
Moore v. Arizona, ~1~ ~.S. 25, 38 L.Ed. 2d 183, 94 S.Ct. 88 
(1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,1), 
Mullican v. United States, 252 F.2d 398 (5th Cir., 1958). 21 
Nelson v. State, 567 P.2d 522 (Okla., 1977) . 21 
Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 327 (4th Cir., 1950) 21 
People v. Conson, 237 P. 799 (Cal., 1925) . 
Pietch v. United States, 110 F. 2d 817 (lOth Cir. , 1940) 
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, l L.Ed.2d 393, 77 
S.Ct. 481 (1957) ........... . 
20 
17 
Schwickrath v. People of Colorado, 411 P.2d 961 (Colo., 1966) 21 
Shuman v. Sheriff of Carson City, 523 P.2d 841 (Nev., 1974) 21 
Silva v. People of Colorado, 407 P.2d 38 (Colo., 1965). . . 20 
ii 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
,lC 
,L 
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. (1969) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
374, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, 89 S. Ct. 575 
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1041, 79 S.Ct. 991 (1959). 
State v. Bohn, 248 P.ll9 (Utah, 1926) 
State v. Bowling, 459 P.2d 454 (Ore., 1969) 
State v. Budau, 518 P.2d 1225 (N .M., 1974). 
State v. Coney, 246 So.2d 793 (La., 1971) 
Scate v. Coo12er, ll4 Ut. 531, 201 P.2d 764, 770 (1949). 
State v. Kennedy, 453 P.2d 658 (Ore., 1969) 
State v. Lozano, 462 p. 2d 710 (Utah, 1969). 
State V. Mathis, 319 p. 2d 134 (Utah, 1957). 
State v. Mead, 32 A. 2d 273 (Conn. 1943) 
State v. Millican, 501 P.2d 1076 (N .M., 19 77) 
State v. Mills, 122 Ut. 306, 249 P.2d 2ll (1952). 
State v. Rasmussen, 418 p. 2d 134 (Utah, 1966) 
State v. Renzo, 443 p. 2d 392 (Utah, 1968) 
State v. Vinson, Lf43 P.2d 700 (Ariz. , 1968) 
State v. IVilliams, lll Ut. 379, 180 P.2d 551, 555 (1947). 
2late v. \Villiams, 356 p. 2d 99 (\ilash. , 1960). 
St~te v. Williams, 493 p. 2d 258 (Kan., 1972). 
~te v. ~.Ji 1s on, 453 P.2d 158 (Utah, 1969). 
iii 
Page 
ll 
7,8 
17 
21 
21 
21 
4 
21 
16 
16 
21 
21 
5 
15,16 
17 
21 
5 
20 
2l 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 37 L.Ed.2d 56, 93 
S.Ct. 2260 (1973) . . . . ..... . 
Taylor v. Oregon, 530 P.2d 526 (Ore., 1975). 
Turner v. Gore, 175 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn., 1943) 
United States v. Apker, 419 F.2d 388 (9th Cir., 1969). 
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 166, 15 L.Ed.2d 627, 86 S. 
Ct. 773 (1966). . . . . . . . . ...... . 
Page 
14,1' 
21 
2l 
21 
R 
United States v. Lepiscopo, 429 F.2d 258 (5th Cir., 1970) .. 
9 ,t -
21 
STATE STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §77-l-10 ( ::_ 95 3) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-8(6) (1953). 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-l (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-51-l (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-65-l (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-65-2 (1953) 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment. 
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment. 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12 . 
iv 
19 
15 'i~ 
l7 
17 
18 
18 
8 '9 '10 'll 
6. 
15 . 
v 
s 
b 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.l' 
' 1~ 
' i ~ 
. 1 
1,-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
MLPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16323 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, appeals from the con-
viction of the crime of Escape in the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, was found guilty 
by a jury be fore the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding, 
of the crime of Escape on January 22, 1979, and was thereafter 
sentenced to be committed to the Utah State Prison for the inde-
terminate term as provided by law . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new 
:rial. Counsel on appeal requests permission to withdraw from the 
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appeal and submits this brief in compliance with Anders v. California, t 
386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 93 (1967). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to Carl H. Loerbs, a counselor at the Utah State 
Prison, on the evening of the 6th of July, 1978, he was assigned to 
count the prisoners confined to a particular area of minimum 
security. On the evening of July 6, 1978, at the hour of 11:00 
p.m. Mr. Loerbs made a count and in "K" Dorm could not locate Ralph 
Henzies nor Johnny Sloan, another inmate assigned to "K" Dorm. 
Mr. Loerbs then made a physical search of the entire "K" Dorm area 
and was not able to locate either individual. Mr. Loerbs identified 
Cl 
Cl 
1' 
tl 
fl 
Wi 
z: 
al 
the appellant as being the same Ralph Leroy Menzies who had previous!: 
been in "K" Dorm of minif'"lum security and further said that the 
appellant did not have permission to his knowledge to leave the 
institution on that occasion. 
Mr. Loerbs also testified that his knowledge of the nature 
of the commitment of the appellant was based on the assumption that 
there was a valid commitment order and that he had no direct evidence 
that the appellant was a bona fide inmate. 
Ron Hinckley, who was a correctional counselor at the Utah 
State Prison, testified that he searched for the escapees on the 
evening of July 6, 1978, and early morning hours of the July 7, 1978. 
and that he found a door that apparently had been forced open. He 
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:.§_, testified that he did not see them again for some time. 
The State called George Byron Stark who introduced a 
copy of a judgment that purported to be an authenticated copy of a 
commitment of Ralph Leroy Menzies to prison. Mr. Gregory L. Bown, 
e 
a Deputy County Attorney, was called to say that on September 10, 
1976, he was present and witnessed the appellant being committed 
to prison pursuant to the case out of which the commitment thereto-
fure entered into evidence had been filed. Charles L. Illsley 
was called as a witness and testified that on the evening of July 
22, 1978, in the course of a routine patrol, he arrested the 
appellant at about 12:45 a.m. He further testified that the 
appellant gave the name of Lee Stevens and the address of 55 White 
sl 
:e 
·Cherry Way, and that he denied having any identification on him. 
The witness further stated that at a subsequent point he saw an 
identification card protruding from appellant's wallet, removed 
the wallet from the truck and discovered that it contained Utah 
State Prison identification to Ralph Leroy Menzies. Pursuant to 
that investigation, the officer subsequently arrested the appellant 
for the charge of Escape. The State then rested, but later was 
allowed to reopen to call Joy Greenwood to the stand. Joy 
Greenwood testified that she was a keeper of the prison records, 
that she had with her the prison inmate record of Ralph Leroy 
11enzies, that the record revealed that he was there pursuant to 
2 valid sentence, and that that sentence had not been terminated, 
~Jided or he had not been paroled at the time of his alleged escape. 
- 3 -
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Mrs. Greenwood further stated on cross-examination that the mere 
fact that a file was in her possession was not evidence that the 
person to whom that filed referred was, in fact, in the Utah 
State Prison. She further testified that in order to show that the 
appellant's sentence had not been terminated, voided, or that he 
had not been put on parole, she relied on the absence of a partie-
ular entry in the file, rather than any individual entry in the 
file itself. In addition Mrs. Greenwood testified that numerous 
people had access to the file and that it was possible that they 
could have altered or destroyed portions of that file without 
her knowledge. 
POINT I 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE 
VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
This Court has on several occasions stated the rules 
concerning the granting of a new trial on the basis that the verdict 
was not supported by the evidence. In State v. Cooper, 114 Ut. 
531, 201 P.2d 764, 770 (1949), this Court stated: 
The question of granting or denying a motion for 
a new trial is a matter largely within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. This court cannot 
substitute its discretion for that of the trial 
court. We do not ordinarily interfere with the 
- 4 -
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rulings of the trial court in either granting 
or denying a new trial, and unless abuse of, or 
failure to exercise, discretion on the part of 
the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the 
ruling of the trial court will be sustained. 
While in appellant's case there was no motion for a new 
trial, the above language would seem to indicate under what circum-
stances this Court will grant a new trial even in the absence of 
amotion for a new trial. The Court also stated: 
The state's evidence is so inherently improbable 
as to be unworthy of belief so that upon ob-
jective analysis it appears that reasonable 
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was guilty, the jury's 
verdict cannot stand. Conversely, if the 
state's evidence was such that reasonable 
Qinds could believe beyond a reasonable doubt 
the defendant was guilty, the verdict must 
be sustained. State v. Mills, 122 Ut. 306, 
249 P.2d 211 (1952). 
It is apparent from these various statements of the law 
that this Court does have the power to order a new trial in appro-
priate cases. This Court has said that: 
We are not unmindful of the settled rule that 
it is the province of the jury to weigh the 
testimony and determine the facts. Neverthe-
less, we cannot escape the responsibility of 
judgment upon whether under the evidence, a 
jury could, and reason, conclude the defendant's 
guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Williams, 111 Ut. 379, 180 P.2d 551, 
555 (1947.) 
Clearly each case must turn upon its own facts and cir-
c~mstances to whether or not a new trial is warranted because the 
- 5 -
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verdict was not supported by the evidence. Appellant contends that 
in the case before the Court the verdict was not supported by the 
evidence and therefore he should be granted a new trial. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF THE CONVICTION 
IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE AND DISMISSAL OF THAT 
CHARGE BECAUSE HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
rniAL. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy . . trial". This provision is embodied in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and hence is 
applicable to state prosecutions as well as federal prosecutions. 
Klopfer v. North Caro:ina, 386 U.S. 213, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1, 87 S.Ct. 
988 (1967). 
Case law reflects certain general principles: 
1) The right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative; 
2) That it is constitutionally persmissible for there to 
be some delay in prosecuting a criminal case, but not inordinate, 
purposeful or oppressive delay; and 
3. Whether the delay involved in completing a particular 
criminal prosecution violates the accused's right to a speedy trial 
depends upon the circumstances. 
The Supreme Court rejected a claim of denial of right to 
speedy trial in Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 49 L.Ed. 950, 25 
- 6 -
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S.Ct. 573 (1905). After the accused had been indicted for federal 
crimes in a New York Federal District Court, and after a continuance 
had been granted, the prosecuting attorney announced an intention 
not to proceed further with the New York prosecution, but instead to 
have the accused removed to the District of Columbia for prosecution 
under the indictments against him there. Holding that the accused 
had not been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, 
the Court emphasized that where a person is charged with more than 
one crime, he cannot be tried for all at the same time; that the 
accused's rights must be considered with regard to the practical 
administration of justice; that the right to a speedy trial cannot 
3. be claimed for one offense and prevent arrest for other offenses; 
md that removal proceedings from one Federal District Court to 
another are merely process for arrest and means of bringing a defendant 
to trial. 
The Supreme Court, here and in later cases, emphasizes that 
"The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent 
'llith delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a 
defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice". 
198 U.S. 77 at 87. "[T]he essential ingredient is orderly expedition 
and not mere speed". Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10, 3 
L.Ed. 2d 1041, 79 S.Ct. 991 (1959). 
In Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 1 L.Ed.2d 393, 
! S.Ct. 481 (1957), the Court said in order for a violation of the 
- 7 -
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constitutional right to speedy trial to exist the delay must be pur-
poseful or oppressive. In that case, the delay in completing pros-
ecution against the defendant by imposing a sentence was accidental 
and was promptly remedied when discovered. Because of the accidental 
nature of the delay, the Court rejected appellant's claim that his 
rights were violated. 
There was no constitutionally impermissible denial of a 
speedy trial in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 2 L.Ed.2d 913, 
78 S.Ct. 829 (1958), where the defendant was tried in a New Jersey 
court in October 1954, four years after the occurrence of the 
alleged crime. The Court found the following circumstances in that 
case justified the delay: l) the defendant was imprisoned in New 
York from November 1950 until January 1952; 2) he was tried in 
New Jersey in May 1952 on indictments charging him with robberies 
of three individuals, was acquitted, and was returned to New York 
and was in prison there in July, 1952, when a New Jersey grand 
jury returned an indictment charging him with robbery of a fourth 
individual; 3) New Jersey reacquired him by extradition in May, 1954; 
and 4) the Court in which he was tried in October, 1954, was not 
in session for criminal trials during the summer months. 
Though Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. l, 3 L.Ed. 2d 
1041, 79 S.Ct. 991 (1959) did not involve an accused's claim of 
denial of right to speedy trial, the Court enunciated a general 
principle in regard to the Sixth Amendment right: 
- 8 -
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While justice should be administered with dis-
patch, the essential ingredient is orderly ex-
pedition and not mere speed. It is well to 
note that in this very case the inordinate 
speed that was generated through the filing 
of the information caused many of the diffi-
culties which led the court below to conclude 
that petitioners had been deprived of due 
process of law. 
3 L.Ed. 2d at 1048. 
Thus the Court warns against the dangers of a trial that is so 
"speedy" as to render a denial of due process. 
The defendants in United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 166, 
15 L.Ed.2d 627, 86 S.Ct. 773 (1966), had their convictions for 
violation of a federal narcotics statute vacated on the ground of a defect 
in their indictments. The Government then had them rearrested 
and reindicted, and each of the new indictments, besides remedying 
the defects in the earlier ones, included two new counts which 
had not been charged in the previous indictments. All counts 
of the new indictments were based upon the same transaction as the 
previous prosecution. Nineteen months had passed between the time 
of the accused's original arrest and the hearing on their last 
indictments. The District Court granted the defendant's motion 
to dismiss the indictments on the ground that they had been denied 
their Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial. The Government 
aopealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The purpose of the 
Sixth Amendment guaranty, the Court said, is to work as a safeguard 
~o prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to 
- 9 -
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minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and 
to limit the possibility that long delay will impair the ability 
of an accused to defend himself. However, because of the many 
procedural safeguards provided a defendant, the ordinary procedures 
for criminal prosecution are designed to move at a deliberate pace. 
The Court again emphasized the concern of a trial that 
was too "speedy": 
A requirement of unreasonable speed would have 
a deleterious effect upon both the rights of the 
accused and upon the ability of society to 
protect itself. 15 L.Ed. at 631. 
In United States v. Ewell, supra, the Court held that 
the accused must have actually been prejudiced as a result of the 
prosecution's delay. The defendant's claim was found to be insub-
stantial, speculative and premature where he had not shown any 
specific evidence which had actually disappeared or been lost and 
no witnesses were known to have disappeared. The Court could find 
Dl 
e: 
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cl 
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wi 
no oppressive or culpable government conduct, and therefore, rejected 
defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. However, in a later case, the 
Court held that an affirmative showing of prejudice is not necessary. 
See Moore v. Arizona, infra. 
The Supreme Court, in Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 
applying the Sixth Amendment to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, held that the state had violated 
the accused's Sixth Amendment right by entering against him a 
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~lle prosequi with leave to reinstate prosecution at a future 
date. Such a procedure would indefinately prolong the oppressive 
effects of the pendency of the indictment, which would subject the 
defendant to public scorn, and would prolong the anxiety and concern 
accompanying public accusation. 
Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 20 L.Ed. 2d 
1047, 88 S. Ct. 2008 (1968), involved an appeal on the issue of 
illegally seized evidence. The Court summarily dismissed defendant's 
claim that he was denied a right to a speedy trial where virtually all 
of the delays of which he complained occurred in the course of 
appellate proceedings and resulted either from his own actions 
or for the need to assure careful reveiw of an unusually complex 
case. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial made obliga-
tory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment may not be dispensed 
, with merely because the accused under a state charge is serving a 
tee 
'Y 
~d 
prison sentence imposed by another jurisdiction, but the state 
in such case, upon accused's demand, has a constitutional duty to 
make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him before the trial 
court. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, 89 S.Ct. 575 
(1969). The Court rejected the notion that a man already in prison 
under a lawful sentence is not in a position to suffer from "undue 
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial". The delay may ultimately 
:esul t in: 
- ll -
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First, the possibility that the defendant 
already in prison might receive a sentence 
at least partially concurrent with the one 
he is serving may be forever lost if trial 
of the pending charge is postponed. Secondly, 
under procedures now widely practiced, the 
duration of his present imprisonment may be 
increased, and the conditions under which he 
must serve his sentence greatly worsened, by 
the pending of another criminal charge out-
standing against him. 
21 L.Ed.2d Ct. 611. 
The "anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation" would have 
an equally depressive effect upon a prisoner as upon a person who 
is at large. Also, the Court notes, the strain and anxiety could 
interfere with the prisoner's ability to take maximum advantage of 
his institutional opportunities for rehabilitation. There is, 
again, the concern wit~ ~he inability of the prisoner to adequately 
preprare his defense. 
A seven-year delay in bringing the accused to trial re-
sulted in a denial of the right to speedy trial. Dickey v. State of 
Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 26 L.Ed.2d 26, 90 S.Ct. 1564 (1970). In that 
case, the Supreme Court held that no valid reason existed for the 
prosecution's deferring the trial in the face of the accused's 
diligent and repeated effort to secure his constitutional right to 
a speedy trial. The Court found that there was abundant evidence 
in the record that the delay had caused actual prejudice to the 
accused as a result of the death of two potential witnesses, the 
unavailability of another potential witness, and the loss of police 
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records and, because of the delay and its consequent prejudice, 
~e accused was entitled to have any further proceedings arising 
out of the robbery charges dismissed. 
The right to a speedy trial attaches once the putative 
defendant in some way becomes an accused; the Sixth Amendment 
does not apply to the period prior to arrest. Marion v. United 
States, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L.Ed. 2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455 (1971). 
The accused in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L.Ed.2d 
101, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), was not denied the right to a speedy 
trial even though he was indicted in September, 1958, and after a 
series of sixteen continuances, was not tried until October, 1963. 
The Court in Barker. set out the criteria by which the speedy trial 
right is to be judged. The Court held: 1) the right to a speedy 
trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other 
f constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be 
quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is 
~possible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when 
the right must be asserted or considered waived, 2) while a defendant's 
assertion of, or failure to assert, his right to a speedy trial is 
me of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the depriva-
tion of such a right, the primary burden remains on the courts and 
~e prosecutors to assure that cases are speedily brought to trial, 
l) a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy 
:rial is subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both 
- l3 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts should 
consider such factors as (a) length of the delay, (b) reason for 
the delay, (c) the defendant's assertion or nonassertion of his 
right, and (d) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, 
in determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been 
denied. ~~ile the petitioner's case, involving as it did such an 
extraordinary delay, was a close one, the facts that prejudice 
to him was minimal and that the petitioner himself did not want a 
speedy trial outweighed the deficiencies attributable to the 
state's failure to try the petitioner sooner, therefore the 
petitioner was not denied his right to a speedy trial. 
The only possible remedy for denying the defendant the 
right to a speedy trial is dismissal of the charges especially in 
view of the policies underlying that Sixth Amendment right. 
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 37 L.Ed.2d 56, 93 S.Ct. 
2260 (1973). The accused's right to a speedy trial is fundamental 
and the duty to provide a prompt trial rests with the Government. 
Unintentional delays caused by crowded courts or understaffed 
prosecutors are given less weight than intentional or oppressive 
delays, however, they still must be considered since the ultimate 
responsibility for such circumstances lies with the Government 
rather than the defendant. The fact that the accused, even one 
who is released pending trial is not interested in being tried 
quickly does not, alone, alter the prosecutor's obligation to provi~ 
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en 
a prompt trial as the public's interest as well as the accused's 
constitutional right command prompt imposition of criminal charges. 
The defendant in Strunk was denied a speedy trial and charges against 
~m were dismissed. 
In earlier cases, the Supreme Court lists prejudice to 
the defendant as necessary in order to show denial of the right 
to speedy tria)_. However, in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 38 
L.Ed.2d 183, 94 S.Ct. 88 (1973), it was held that the four factors 
to be considered in determining whether the right to speedy trial 
has been denied, as enunciated in Barker, are neither necessary or 
a sufficient condition to base a finding of a denial of the right 
to speedy trial. Thus, an affirmative demonstration of prejudice 
w the accused is not necessary to prove a denial of his constitu-
tional right (cf. United States v. Ewell, supra). The Court also 
ooted that prejudice is not confined to the possible prejudice to 
his defense in the proceedings, but the Court must also consider, 
inter alia, the possible impact which pending charges might have on 
:1is prospects for parole and meaningful rehabilitation. The defend-
ant's case in Moore was remanded for reassessment under proper 
Sixth Amendment constitutional standards. 
The right to a speedy trial is also guaranteed by the 
:tah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. In State v. Rasmussen, 
-iS P.2d 134 (Utah, 1966), it was held that Utah Code Ann. §77-18-8(6) 
d< ;953) which provides that the defendant in all criminal cases shall 
-,entitled to a speedy public trial within 30 days after arraignment, 
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is a statutory implementation of the constitutional guarantee to a 
speedy trial. Though the defendant in the Rasmussen case was not 
brought to trial until 45 days after arraignment, the Court held 
the deiay was not a denial of defendant's right to a speedy trial 
where the circumstances causing the delay were beyond the control 
of the prosecution or the court, and where there was no intent 
to prejudice the defendant. 
It was argued in State v. Lozano, 462 P.2d 710 (Utah, 1969) 
that Utah Code Ann. §77-18-8(6) (1953) is mandatory. The Court 
rejected the argument and said that the provision is not mandatory 
but directory, and "each case must be examined in light of its own 
particular facts". However, where defendant was arrested on January 
1, made two demands for the speedy trial, objected to prosecutor's 
request for continuance on July 12, and was not brought to trial 
until August 5, the Court held that incarceration prior to trial, 
without cause or excuse, was undue and oppressive and constituted 
denial of defendant's right to speedy trial under the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. 
a 
m 
The defendant in State v. Mathis, 319 P. 2d 134 (Utah, 1957) B, 
claimed that a 13-day delay in being brought to trial constituted t 
a denial of his Sixth Amendment right. The Court noted that anyone h 
accused of a crime, especially one incarcerated awaiting trial, is 
entitled to have his case tried with all possible dispatch, if he so t: 
desires, citing the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12. The d, 
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defendant also based his claim upon Utah Code Ann. §77-51-1 (1953) 
~ich deals with dismissal for failure to prosecute, which is a 
legislative implementation of the constitutional guarantee of a 
speedy trial. The Court found no transgression from that statute. 
In addition, there was no reversible error where the prosecutor 
did not file an affidavit for continuance pursuant to §77-29-1 re-
garding postponement of trial, but instead orally made the motion 
i9) for continuance and gave statements in support thereof. "In the 
absence of any indication of lack of good faith or of diligence 
on the part of the state which resulted in a substantial infringe-
ment upon the defendant's rights or in some manner prevented or im-
ry paired his ability to defend", the Court said, the granting of 
a continuance is well within the trial court's discretion. 
In the case of State v. Renzo, 443 P.2d 392 (Utah, 1968), 
the Court held that the constitutonal speedy trial guarantee is not 
applicable until after prosecution is instituted, and prosecution 
s is instituted when an indictment is returned or an information 
filed. The Court also restated the rule enunciated in State v. 
57) Bohn, 248 P.ll9 (Utah, 1926), that "a defendant cannot claim 
that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated unless 
te ~e asks the court to grant him a trial". 443 P. 2d at 395. See 
also Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817 (lOth Cir. 1940) where 
so the Court said that in the absence of an affirmative request or 
demand for trial, it is presumed that the accused acquiesced in the 
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delay and therefore cannot complain. Note that the United States 
Supreme Court in Barker lists the absence of an affirmative request 
as only a factor to consider. 
However, a statutory right to a speedy trial cannot be 
forfeited by the defendant's silence. In State v. Wilson, 453 P.2d 
158 (Utah, 1969), the accused did not forfeit his right to have 
charges against him dismissed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-65-2 
(1953) by remaining silent and failing to request an earlier setting 
when the trial court set date for trial beyond the 90-day period 
required under §77-65-1. The Court held that the burden of com-
plying with the statute rests on the prosecutor. 
The pret=ial delays in the above entitled case occurred 
when this case was d.~l.2:ec1 in order to try an armed robbery case 
against the same appellant (R. 75). Continuances in the armed 
robbery case and the necessity for a re-trial of that case following 
a hung jury in the intial trial were required. At that time, 
counsel for appellant waived the 90-day disposition theretofore 
filed in order to allow re-trial of the robbery case first 
(R. 76). Arraignment on the escape charge occurred September 
1, 1978, and the appellant was not tried until January 15 of the 
following year. Appellant contends that the delay of a four and 
a half months was in violation of the appellant's constitutional 
rights to a speedy trial. 
Pursuant to the cases cited above, counsel for the appel-
lant requests the Court to decide lvhether or not the proceedings 
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g 
~ this case warrant a dismissal for the failure of the State to 
grant the appellant a speedy trial. Appellant contends that the 
delays prior to trial preclude the State from going forward at 
the time of trial. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT PROSECUTION CONVICTION AND 
SENTENCillG OF THE APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF ES-
CAPE CONSTITUTES DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND/OR DOUBLE 
PUNISHMENT FOR SAID CRIME. 
The appellant contends that the punishment levied against 
the appellant by the Board of Pardons in the form of re-setting of 
the appellant's release date incarceration in maxiumum security and 
other penalties levied against the appellant, constitute punishment 
~r the crime and that it is inappropriate for him to be convicted 
and punished by the Court in an additional proceeding (R. 76) . 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be 
"twice put in jeopardy" for the "same offense". That provision 
~s made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause 
o: the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 785 
(1969) . 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 also pro-
:1ibi ts double jeopardy. The statutory enactment of that constitu-
:ional right is Utah Code Ann. §77-1-10 (1953). 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
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Court have addressed the precise issue of whether a criminal prose-
cution for crime of escape is prohibited by the double jeopardy 
clause of the Constitution because the escapee was, on his recapture, a 
subjected to discipline by prison authorities for the prison disci- 5 
pline violation involved. There is, however, an abundance of 
case law in other jurisdictions. 5 
The unanimous consensus on that issue is that a defendant 
who is criminally prosecuted for escape from prison is not twice 51 
put in jeopardy even though he is subject to discipline by the prison ll 
board for his attempted escape. The reasoning is that the proceeding Si 
before the prison board is administrative and not judicial. People p 
v. Conson, 237 P. 799 (Cal. 1925). "Jeopardy" in its constitutional ~!' 
and common-law sense, ~as a strict application to criminal prosecu- 1: 
tions only. Disciplinary actions by order of the warden for escape 
is not a criminal prosecution. Ex Parte Kirk, 252 P. 2d 1032 (Okla., Vi 
1953). For plea of double jeopardy to be invoked, it is incumbent (1 
upon appellant to show that he has previously been placed on trial Co 
before a court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment or F. 
information for the same offense. State v. Williams, 356 P.2d 99 (5 
(Hash., 1960). Statute providing that an escape shall not be eligibli Ci 
for parole or the accumulation of good time for certain period sub- ~ 
sequent to his recapture and return to prison does not impose addi- l9 
tional punishment amounting to double jeopardy. Silva v. People 
of Colorado, 407 P.2d 38 (Colo., 1965). Hhere administrative penalt 
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imposed does not result in confinement beyond maximum term set in 
imposed sentence, no double jeopardy or double punishment attaches 
re, as a result of prosecution under felonious escape statute. 
Schwickrath v. People of Colorado, 4ll P. 2d 961 (Colo., 1966). 
State v. Williams, 493 P.2d 258 (Kan., 1972); Collins v. State, 
524 P. 2d 715 (Kan., 1974); Shuman v. Sheriff of Carson City, 523 
p 2d 841 (Nev., 1974); State v. Millican, 501 P.2d 1076 (N.M., 1977); 
State v. Budau, 518 P.2d 1225 (N.M., 1974); Boyle v. State, 569 P.2d 
>on 1026 (Okla., 1977); Nelson v. State, 567 P.2d 522 (Okla., 1977); 
.ng State v. Kennedy, 453 P.2d 658 (Ore., 1969); Taylor v. Oregon, 530 
P 2d 526 (Ore., 1975); State v. Bowling, 459 P.2d 454 (Ore., 1969); 
11 ~!artz v. State, 566 P.2d 222 (Wyo., 1977); Hamby v. State, 559 P.2d 
1388 (Wyo. , 1977). 
Other cases in support of the above rule are State v. 
Vinson, 443 P.2d 700 (Ariz., 1968); Turner v. Gore, 175 S.W. 2d 317 
(Tenn., 1943); State v. Head, 32 A.2d 273 (Conn., 1943); State v. 
Canez., 246 So. 2d 793 (La., 1971); Patterson v. United States, 183 
F.2d 327 (4th Cir., 1950); Mullican v. United States, 252 F.2d 398 
(5th Cir., 1958); United States v. Lepiscopo, 429 F.2d 258 (5th 
b 1, 
•· Cir., 1970); United States v. Apker, 419 F.2d 388 (9th Cir., 1969); 
~van v. State of Louisiana, 314 F.Supp. 1047 (U.S.D.C., E.D., La., 
!970) . 
c: 
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CONCLUSION 
Counsel for the appellant respectfully submits the above 
entitled analysis of the points of law raised by the appellant and 
requests permission to withdraw, believing the appeal is without 
meritorious grounds. The counsel for the appellant further sub-
mits that the foregoing brief discusses all the law applicable 
to the only points that could arguably be presented on appeal. 
DATED this __ day of July, 1979. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
BRAD RICH 
Attorney at Law 
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